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I. INTRODUCTION
The collapse of once-great corporations such as Enron and
WorldCom drew intense scrutiny to the ivory-tower executives
heading those institutions, as well as to the severe economic
consequences of fraudulent financial disclosures.' While the Enron
debacle involved the use of off-balance-sheet transactions to shift
losses to a complex network of subsidiaries and partnerships, the
misstated losses at WorldCom appear to have been simple fraud.2 In
August 2002, Michael Kooper, a senior executive in Enron's finance
department, pled guilty to charges of money laundering and
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.' While nineteen Enron employees
have been indicted by the Federal government, the two top executives,
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1. See, e.g., Beth Belton, "We Have to Very Quickly Clean the Slate," BUSINESS WEEK
ONLINE (July 12, 2002), at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jul2002/nf
20020712.0162.htm; The Backlash Against Business, ECONOMIST, July 6, 2002, at 27; Kurt
Eichenwald, The Nation: Clay Feet; Could Capitalists Actually Bring Down Capitalism?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2002, § 4, at 1.
2. Id. Off-balance-sheet transactions are those not required to be reported in quarterly or
annual financial statements, such as the balance sheet, which lists assets, liabilities, and equity.
For Enron, these off-balance-sheet transactions appeared in the form of Special Purpose Entities
(SPEs) that were used to disguise liabilities and high-risk ventures. Matthew Goldstein, Raising
the Bar on Off-Balance-Sheet Finance, THESTREET.COM (July 4, 2003), at
http://www.thestreet.com/markets/matthewgoldstein/10097959.html. For a comprehensive
academic account of the Enron situation, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002). For a more detailed account of the WorldCom
scandal, see Kurt Eichenwald, 2 Ex-Officials at WorldCom Are Charged in Huge Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al.
3. The Charge Sheet, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2002, at 62.
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Jeffery Skilling and Kenneth Lay, have not been tied to the accounting
fraud.4 Scott Sullivan, a former chief financial officer at WorldCom,
was indicted along with WorldCom's director of general accounting
for securities fraud and for making false filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC").' The economics of securities
investment leads one to conclude that the negative impact of these
corporate failures on investor confidence has disrupted capital
markets.6
Had institutional investors, individual shareholders, and
employees with pensions at stake known the truth about the collapsed
companies, billions of dollars worth of time and money would have
been allocated to other uses.' Both initial investment choices
(securities with no history) and the valuation of existing stock prices
(securities that have been on the market for some time) should reflect
an assessment of the earnings prospects and risks associated with the
issuing company and its operations.8 When investors and analysts
believe their financial assessments are misled by questionable or
fraudulent financial disclosures, the market fails to correctly allocate
resources.9 The general economic malaise that followed the collapse of
Enron, WorldCom, and others lends empirical support to this
model.1"
This loss in investor confidence prompted Congress and
President Bush to adopt a spate of new measures designed to address"systemic and structural weaknesses affecting the capital markets."1
Collectively, this legislation is embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), which impacts nearly every aspect of the
system that brings financial information from a public corporation to
existing and potential investors, including the areas of accounting
oversight, auditor independence, corporate governance, analyst
4. Enron's Fastow, Wife Charged, CNN MONEY, at http://money.cnn.com/2003/
05/01/news/companies/enron/index.htm (May 1, 2003).
5. Id.
6. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 46-47 (2002) (noting that investors may tend to
overestimate risks after revelations of corporate fraud just as they underestimated risks during a
bubble market).
7. See generally supra note 1.
8. RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 316 (1980).
9. See generally id. (the more investors see a corporation's representative data as limited or
uncertain, the more they will discount its value for risk).
10. See supra note 1.
11. JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, LAW
AND EXPLANATION 13 (2002).
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conflicts of interests, and fraud. 2 In response to the Enron and
WorldCom disasters, Congress stated that the purpose of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to protect investors by improving the reliability
and accuracy of corporate disclosures made pursuant to securities
laws. 13
This Comment focuses on sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Section 302 requires Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), or their equivalents, to personally
certify the accuracy of financial disclosure filings required by the SEC
and to vouch for the reliability of the internal corporate controls that
produce that information.'4  Section 906 contains an additional
certification requirement and provides specific criminal penalties for
willful or knowing violations of that requirement.'" An efficiency-
based analysis of these two sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
suggests that including a recklessness standard of intent would be
more likely to increase the accuracy of the information, reduce the
aggregate costs of obtaining the information, and restore much-needed
investor confidence. As a result, Congress should amend the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to create a single, coherent certification
requirement with criminal penalty provisions that incorporate
recklessness as a standard of intent giving rise to criminal culpability.
In order to understand why Congress should amend the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, one must understand how security disclosure
laws evolved. This Comment begins by briefly looking at how
financial disclosure regulations and criminal sanctions have operated
in the years leading up to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Relevant portions
of the landmark Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 6 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 7 make up the subject
matter of Part II. Part III looks at the specific changes, or lack thereof,
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has attempted to impose on financial
disclosure laws. This Comment gives particular attention to the
currently bifurcated and incoherent certification requirements of
sections 302 and 906, which are redundant and largely ineffectual.
One must understand these sections in order to grasp the failures of
12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2003)). Sarbanes-Oxley was signed into
law by President Bush on July 30, 2002.
13. Id. pmbl.
14. Seeid. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003).
15. Seeid. § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2003).
17. Id. §§ 78a-mm (2003).
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the prior system and the impact, if any, that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is
likely to have on the regulatory failures that it purports to combat.
Finally, Part IV will show that Congress should amend the
certification requirements and the criminal penalties in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in two important ways. First, Congress should rid the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the redundant and confusing dual certification
requirements in order to reduce compliance costs and dispose of what
could be a costly trap for the unwary. Second, the amended version of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should include a recklessness standard of
intent that will encourage executives to ensure that financial
information is accurate enough to protect all stakeholders and to
restore investor confidence. 8
II. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAWS BEFORE THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT
Financial disclosure requirements are primarily found in two
landmark securities laws from the Depression era-the Securities Act
of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act"). 9 The Securities Act requires that companies
register all the securities it offers to the general public with the SEC
and that it provide a prospectus for prospective investors." This Act
focuses on the initial investment scenario, where a security or venture
has no history upon which investors can rely.2 The Exchange Act
requires all companies listing securities on a national exchange to
register with the SEC and to file annual and periodic (most often
quarterly) financial reports with the SEC.2  In contrast to the
Securities Act, the Exchange Act was intended to provide investors
with ongoing information useful in deciding whether to purchase
existing securities on an open market.2 3 These two securities laws
often required duplicate filings and superfluous paperwork from a
common core of information. 4
18. "Stakeholders" includes investors in public securities, employees, and the general
population whose fortune may rise and fall with an economy driven by corporate activity. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (7th ed. 1999).
19. 2 TOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 22
(4th ed. 2002).
20. 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 61 (2002) [hereinafter 1
BLOOMENTHAL (2002)].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See generally 2 HAZEN, supra note 19, at 22-25.
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The dual disclosure schemes remained largely separate until
1982, when the SEC adopted a partially integrated disclosure system,
known as Regulation S-K, that attempted to combine elements of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.25 Regulation S-K requires
management to disseminate annual and quarterly reports of audited
financial statements; to make disclosures regarding the corporation's
liquidity, capital resources, and results of operations; and to discuss
favorable and adverse trends.26  Regulation S-K places a greater
emphasis on periodic disclosures, as established in the Exchange Act,
rather than on the initial prospectus reporting of the Securities Act.27
Given that both the Exchange Act (through Regulation S-K) and
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (discussed in Part III infra) address the same
periodic disclosure requirements, it is important to compare the
standards of criminal liability and penalties imposed by these Acts.28
This comparison should make clear that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has
done little to change the criminalization of inaccurate and fraudulent
disclosures post-Enron/WorldCom. The Exchange Act establishes
criminal liability for willful violations of all its provisions, and for
willfully and knowingly making false or misleading statements in all
documents required to be filed under the Exchange Act.29
25. Id. at 23 (stating that the move to uniformity covered Forms 10-Q and 10-K, the
annual shareholder report under the Exchange Act of 1934, and Forms S-I, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-8, S-
11, and formerly S-18 under the Securities Act of 1933).
26. Id. at 31. "Liquidity" refers to the amount of time required to convert an asset into
cash or pay a liability; "capital" structure is the composition of the invested capital, such as the
mix of debt and equity financing. SHANNON PRATT, THE LAWYER'S BUSINESS VALUATION
HANDBOOK 205, 403 (2000); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (2003) for more detailed
requirements; "results of operations" requirements are similarly defined in id.
27. See l BLOOMENTHAL (2002), supra note 20, at 63.
28. Bruce C. Bennett & Graham Robinson, Executive Certifications, in 34TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 552 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. BO-01GD, 2002). SEC rules promulgated pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
require certification for Forms 10-K, 10-Q 10-KSB, 10-QSB, 20-F, 40-F and N-SAR (including
any amendment to or transition reports on such forms), but not for Forms 6-K or 8-K. Id.
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2002) provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than section
78dd-1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is
made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter,
or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any
statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed under this
chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a
registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or by
any self-regulatory organization in connection with an application for membership or
participation therein or to become associated with a member thereof, which statement
was false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be
fined not more than $1,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both,
except that when such person is a person other than a natural person, a fine not
exceeding $2,500,000 may be imposed; but no person shall be subject to
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Historically, a natural person convicted under section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act could be fined up to $1 million, or imprisoned up to ten
years, or both.3" However, a person could not be criminally liable if he
or she could prove lack of knowledge of the rule or regulation that was
violated. 3' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act purported to make meaningful
changes to this system of criminal enforcement.3 2
III. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT FAILED TO MEANINGFULLY IMPACT
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAWS
Similar to the Exchange Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addresses
periodic reporting standards. It requires that companies file under
sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, which also ensures that
financial reports are certified.3 Pursuant to section 13(a), every issuer
of a security registered on an exchange must file the following
information with the SEC: (1) information and documents needed to
keep reasonably current the information filed in registering; and (2)
annual and quarterly reports as the SEC may prescribe.34 Section
15(d) simply covers any supplemental filings of annual or quarterly
reports.35  Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not make substantive
changes to the reporting requirements: it seeks to make those reports
more reliable by requiring personal certifications from executives.
The remainder of this part discusses the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a
mechanism affecting the regime of criminal penalties used to
encourage accurate disclosures of section 13(a) and 15(d) material.
imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves
that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
(emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Id. Practically speaking, an executive could claim that he or she did not understand
that certain "bottom line" figures were the result of improper accounting methods because he or
she was not an expert in accounting, or perhaps because the executive simply did not have the
time to review the accounting procedures of a multi-billion dollar company- a somewhat
successful tactic thus far in the case of Enron. See supra notes 3-4. It seems the burden would
be on the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission to produce a"smoking gun" document indicating a willful and knowing disregard of disclosure laws.
32. This Comment only examines the criminal penalties found in the Exchange Act and
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Private civil liability, available under SEC Rule 1Ob-5 and section 18(a)
of the Exchange Act, are certainly relevant to the issue of creating incentives for more complete
financial disclosures, but are beyond the scope of this Comment.
33. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2003). The U.S.C. cognates
to sections 13(a) and 15(d) are 15 U.S.C. § 78m and § 78o(d), respectively.
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a)(l)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1)-(2) (2003).
35. Id. § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2003).
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A. Dual Certification Requirements
From a practical standpoint, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is difficult
to understand because of inconsistencies that were most likely caused
by the haste with which it was drafted.36 The certification provisions
are exemplary in this regard. Commentators have noted that sections
302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act actually present two distinct
certification requirements.37 While both sections specifically refer to
sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act," because section 302 is
a securities law, it is subject to rulemaking authority by the SEC.39
Because the SEC has rulemaking authority, it can specify methods of
certification, offer guidance in formal opinions, and promulgate rules
regarding enforcement. In contrast to section 302, section 906 is
codified under the crimes and criminal procedure section of the
United States Code, Title 18, which subjects those provisions to direct
enforcement by the Justice Department without SEC input.4" Section
906 establishes a bifurcated criminal sentencing scheme based on two
intent requirements: "willful" and "knowing" violations."
Understanding the substance of these two sections of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, as well as the operational relationship between them, helps
make it clear that Congress should amend the statute to adopt
recklessness as a standard of criminal intent for certification violations.
1. The Requirements and Implications of Section 302
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act not only requires that the
CEO and CFO certify that the company's section 13(a) and 15(d)
financial reports are accurate, but it also requires that the CEO and
CFO state that they have designed and reviewed their company's
internal controls to ensure that they receive the necessary material
information.42 Although the "internal controls" language in section
36. Bennett & Robinson, supra note 28, at 542, 545. WorldCom announced its discovery
of illegitimate accounting practices requiring a $4 billion restatement of earnings on June 25,
2002. Id. at 542. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is a massive piece of legislation, was passed by
Congress and signed into law on July 30, 2002. Id. at 545.
37. Id. at 546; 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 692-93
(2003) [hereinafter 1 BLOOMENTHAL (2003)].
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2003); § 906(a)-(b), 18
U.S.C. § 1350(a)-(b) (2003).
39. Bennett & Robinson, supra note 28, at 547 (referring to the new SEC rules made
pursuant to its § 302 authority).
40. Id. at 551 (noting that the SEC has stated that § 906 is not within its jurisdiction).
41. Id.
42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003) provides:
(a) Regulations required. The Commission shall, by rule, require, for each company
filing periodic reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78o(d)), that the principal executive officer or officers
2003]
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302(4) is relatively straightforward, its consequences are nebulous
because section 302 does not include a penalties scheme for
misrepresentations or omissions of each required representation.43
Instead, as an amendment to the Exchange Act, section 302 implicitly
relies on the criminal remedies traditionally available under the
Exchange Act for enforcement.44 The ambiguity of section 302 is
further exacerbated because it requires reconciliation with the
separate, yet similar, requirements of section 906."
and the principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar
functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted under
either such section of the Act that-
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;
(2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make statements made, in light of the circumstances under which the
statements were made, not misleading;
(3) based on such officer's knowledge the financial statements, and other
financial information included in the report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer as of,
and for, the periods presented in the reports;
(4) the signing officers-
(A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls;
(B) have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information
relating to the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to
such officers by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which the periodic reports are being prepared;
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls as of a
date within 90 days prior to the report; and
(D) have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of
their internal controls based on their evaluation as of that date.
43. Id.
44. 1 BLOOMENTHAL (2003), supra note 37, at 693. For a definition of the Exchange Act
section 32 penalties, see 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2002).
45. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003) provides:
Failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports.
(a) Certification of periodic financial reports.-Each periodic report containing
financial statements filed by an issuer with the Securities Exchange
Commission pursuant to 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) shall be accompanied by a written
statement by the chief executive officer and chief financial officer (or
equivalent thereof) of the issuer.
(b) Content.-The statement required under subsection (a) shall certify that the
periodic report containing the financial statements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act [o]f 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and that
the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
issuer.
(c) Criminal penalties.-Whoever-
(1) certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement
Criminalizing Executive Recklessness
2. The Requirements and Implications of Section 906
Section 906 was included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an
afterthought. A separate bill, the proposed White-Collar Crime
Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002 ("WCCPEA"), was undergoing the
amendment process in the Senate during the summer of 2002.46
Senators Biden and Hatch offered what would become section 906 as
an amendment to the proposed WCCPEA that the Senate passed by a
unanimous vote of 96-0."7 As the Sarbanes-Oxley Act grew, it began
to subsume similar legislation, such as the proposed WCCPEA,
which was ultimately modified and added to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
as Title IX: White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements.4"
On its face, section 906 appears to be ineffectual by way of
redundancy.49 First, section 906 refers to certifications of financial
statements under sections 13(a) 'and 15(d) of the Exchange Act50-
both of which are also required under section 302.1 Second, while
section 906 provides amendments to the criminal code by creating
harsher maximum penalties,5 2 section 1106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
amends the Exchange Act by increasing the maximum prison time to
twenty years and the maximum fine to $5 million, precisely the same
penalties adopted in section 906." As noted, the criminal sanctions
for violating the section 302 requirements exist by implication through
those now-identical Exchange Act penalties.5 4 Thus, to the degree
willfulness is the standard of intent used by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Exchange Act, the penalties that follow from section 906 add
nothing to a system of corporate criminal laws that gave us Enron and
WorldCom.
does not comport with all the requirements set forth in this section
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both; or
(2) willfully certifies any statement . . . knowing that the periodic report
accompanying the statement does not comport with all the
requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than
$5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
46. 1 BLOOMENTHAL (2003), supra note 37, at 692.
47. 148 CONG. REC. S6541 (2002) (S. amend. No. 4186).
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 901-906, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745, 804-06
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 29 U.S.C. (2003)).
49. See generally 1 BLOOMENTHAL (2003), supra note 37, at 692-94.
50. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(a)-(b), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a)-(b) (2003).
51. Id. § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2003).
52. Id. § 906(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2003). Knowing violators shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. Id. Willful violators shall be fined
not more than $5,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. Id.
53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §1106, 15 U.S.C. 78ff (2003).
54. 1 BLOOMENTHAL (2003), supra note 37, at 693.
2003]
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Although appearing harmless, the language of section 906 could
potentially become a subtle trap for unwary executives and their
corporate counsel in at least two ways. First, in stating that sections
13(a) and 15(d) reports must "fully compl[y] with the requirements of
the Exchange Act," section 906 leaves out the "materiality" qualifier
found in section 302." Because such complex reports are unlikely to
be entirely free of mistakes, even one minor mistake will render a
section 906 certification false when the statute is read literally.56 Thus,
there is a need for language stating that only "material"
misstatements-those that would have some relevance to an investor
or regulator-are criminal violations. Second, the Exchange Act
penalties found in section 32(a) only apply to willful and knowing
violations, 7 while section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies to
willful or knowing violations. 8 Although the Model Penal Code
generally does not distinguish between "willful" and "knowing"
violations, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act penalizes willful violations more
severely than knowing violations.59 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is even
more frustrating because it adds uncertainty by not defining
"knowingly" or "willfully." As described in the following section, it is
difficult to parse out the distinction between these standards of intent.
B. Applications of the Criminal Intent Standards in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and Beyond
This section deals with the sometimes subtle and
indistinguishable levels of intent used to define the past and present
financial disclosure fraud crimes. The standards applicable to the
Exchange Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are those known as"willfulness" and "knowingly." What has never been used as a
standard of intent in the statutory financial disclosure context is"recklessness," although at least one court appears to have come close
55. Bennett & Robinson, supra note 28, at 566.
56. Id. Until courts hear criminal cases based on violations of section 906, enforcement
expectations will be unclear and compliance will be more costly.
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2002).
58. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(c)(1)-(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1)-(2) (2003).
59. A requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts
knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose
further requirements appears. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (2003). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
imposes different penalties under the two standards, which clearly indicates Congress' intent to
distinguish the two. In this case, "willfully" appears to be synonymous with "purposely" under
the Model Penal Code.
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to adopting it sua sponte.6 ° The following three subsections discuss
each standard of intent separately as they might apply to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.
1. Willful Violations
The least likely, but easiest to identify, event implicating the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act would be a willful violation of the certification
requirement. An executive implicated under section 906(c)(2) or
section 302 (via section 32(a) of the Exchange Act) would either have
to order lower level managers to falsify or misrepresent information on
financial statements, or do those acts herself (if that is even possible
given the vast division of labor in most publicly traded corporations).
61
Then, the executive must personally certify the fraudulent statements
with the intent to deceive regulators. The violations at WorldCom
may exemplify a willful violation because there is evidence that some
former executives were involved in the decision to hide several billion
dollars worth of expenses over a number of years.62
2. Knowing Violations
In the case of a knowing violation, one or both of the certifying
executives must be aware that an employee had intentionally or
unintentionally misstated financial information that was bound for the
SEC.63  One might argue that the failure to correct such a
misstatement before the certification would only be an omission to act,
which could justify the softer penalties found in section 906(c)(1),
rather than the harsher violations required under the willfulness
standard. However, the certification requirement still demands an
affirmative act-the personal oath that the disclosures are materially
accurate to the best of the executive's knowledge.64 The alternative is
for the executive to refuse to certify the disclosures by the periodic
deadline, which carries its own costs in terms of enforcement by the
SEC, but hardly represents the kind of culpability associated with a
60. See supra note 29; see also United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 873 (1993).
61. "Willfulness" has been described as the intentional doing of the wrong acts, but not
necessarily with knowledge of the law that is being broken. Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408,
414 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting the "knowledge" and "reckless disregard" standards).
62. See Eichenwald, supra note 2; Barnaby J. Feder & Seth Schiesel, WorldCom Finds $3.3
Billion More in Irregularities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al.
63. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2002).
64. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Release No. 33-8124, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276, 57,277 (Sept. 9, 2002) (amending the
annual and quarterly report forms to include text for the certification of each individual report
required under sections 13(a) and 15(d)).
2003]
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blatant lie.65  Given that a knowing violation includes an affirmative
act of deception, established when the corporate officer certifies a false
financial statement, it will be especially difficult to distinguish
knowing and willful violations in the practical application of the law.
Thus, any meaningful distinction between section 906 and the
Exchange Act penalties is very difficult to define.66
3. The Recklessness Standard and the Similar Willful Blindness
Standard
Under the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness, "[a]
person acts recklessly ... when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material element [of an offense] exists or
will result from his conduct. '67  The "disregard" must be a "gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor's situation, '68 but there is no requirement
that the actor be "practically certain" that the conduct will result in a
violation of the law.69 Thus, this standard is a distinct step below
"knowingly" in the hierarchy of mens rea. A key factor in the
recklessness standard is the existence of an objectively verifiable"substantial and unjustifiable risk."7  In the corporate disclosure
context, this means that executives of corporations with a recent
history of violations likely would operate under the cloud of greater
risk. However, each case will require a fact-specific analysis.
There is some support in the case law for the use of a willful
blindness standard of intent for violations of section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act, which appears to be similar to a recklessness standard.
For example, in United States v. Gruenberg,71 the court held that a
willful blindness jury instruction was appropriate where defendants
were charged under 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.72 The defendants, who were the
co-founders and officers of a corporation that manufactured
65. In Search of Honesty, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2002, at 49 (noting that the SEC is
authorized to impose penalties for the failure to certify by the required deadline).
66. Recall that the only difference between the intent requirements in the Exchange Act
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that the former requires both willful and knowing violations,
while the latter applies either. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(2002) (see supra note 29 for the text of this statute); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18
U.S.C. § 1350 (2003) (see supra note 45 for the text of this statute).
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
70. Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
71. 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 873 (1993).
72. This is the U.S.C. cognate to section 32(a) of the Exchange Act. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2002) .
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biochemical culturing devices, fraudulently misstated the
corporation's sales figures in order to artificially inflate the price of its
stock. 13 The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support
an inference of "deliberate ignorance" when one defendant personally
loaned $2.8 million to the other defendant, which was used to pay off
accounts receivable owed by the corporation's most important
distributor.74 This account represented approximately sixty percent of
the corporation's total sales in fiscal year 1986." 5 The court held that
the failure to investigate the need to personally finance a customer's
debt, which was highly unusual, supported a jury instruction of willful
blindness.76
Courts have equated the recklessness standard with deliberate
ignorance.77 Deliberate ignorance is a step below acting with the
specific knowledge that fraud has occurred, and in that sense, it is
more akin to acting recklessly. Although Gruenberg may seem to
indicate a willingness to move towards adopting a recklessness
standard, the close corporation setting and blatancy of the fraud in
that case are better viewed as a finding that the violations simply could
not have been unknown, as the defendant claimed. Thus, courts have
not gone so far as to apply a true recklessness standard in the securities
fraud context.
Gruenberg notwithstanding, recklessness is absent from the
Exchange Act.78 While Congress decided not to use that standard of
intent in crafting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is important to recognize
that it did come under consideration. 79 During the Senate debate over
the legislation that ultimately became section 906, Senator Biden
initially used the language "recklessly" in place of "knowing," stating
that this proposed law was designed to set "a high standard."8
Without explanation, the Senator subsequently asked and received
unanimous consent to change the language from "recklessly" to"recklessly and knowingly," effectively raising the standard to one of
73. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d at 973.
74. Id. at 974-75.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 1271 (8th Cir. 1992).
78. Cf. United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1100-02 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding an
instruction that the element of knowledge of a given fact may be satisfied by proof that a
defendant acted with reckless disregard of what the truth was in bank and wire fraud case, but
cautioning that the use of the term "reckless" should be avoided because it could mislead the jury
about the proper standard).
79. 148 CONG. REC. S6546 (2002).
80. Id.; 1 BLOOMENTHAL (2003), supra note 37, at 694.
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"knowingly" with the use of the conjunctive "and,'" Finally, in
Conference Committee, the language was changed again into its final
form, using only the term "knowingly, 82 making it even more
apparent that recklessness would have no part in the new legislation.
The following part explains how this calculated decision to disregard
the recklessness standard dampened the potential effectiveness of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with regard to its stated intent: "address[ing]
systemic and structural weaknesses affecting the capital markets."83
Moreover, the early inclusion of a recklessness standard in the
securities fraud context makes the important point that such a
standard should be given serious consideration by lawmakers.
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD ACT TO STREAMLINE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT AND ADOPT A RECKLESSNESS STANDARD OF INTENT
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's certification requirements failed to
meaningfully alter existing criminal penalties for materially inaccurate
financial disclosures. Thus, in choosing to do little more than increase
the maximum criminal penalties for violations of laws in existence
long before Enron and WorldCom, lawmakers seem not to have taken
seriously both the need for accurate financial disclosures and the
ability of corporate executives to control the processes that generates
this information.84 Moreover, section 906 is redundant, yet just
ambiguous enough to be a costly danger to unwary executives and
their corporate counsel. An efficiency-based analysis suggests that
Congress should amend section 906 to abolish the dual certification
requirements, and tie it to section 302 through a recklessness standard
of intent. This amendment would be more likely to increase the
accuracy of financial statements and to reduce the aggregate costs of
obtaining the information, while also restoring much-needed investor
confidence.
81. 148 CONG. REC. S6546 (2002); 1 BLOOMENTHAL (2003), supra note 37, at 694. The
"recklessly" language is meaningless when used in conjunction with "knowingly."
82. 148 CONG. REC. S6546 (2002); 1 BLOOMENTHAL (2003), supra note 37, at 694.
83. HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 11. As noted, this was a primary purpose of
the legislation as a whole, and the certification requirements in particular.
84. Although the record is devoid of reasons for using "knowledge" rather than
"recklessness," it might be the result of haste, lobbying efforts, or a genuine belief that a lower
standard would be ineffective or unfair.
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A. Congress Should Abolish the Dual Certifications by Amending Section
906
As discussed in Part III.A.2, section 906 is largely redundant, yet
potentially costly because of its lack of a materiality qualifier and the
difficulty of parsing out the difference between willful and knowing
violations. These inconsistencies add to the cost of compliance, which
is a barrier to achieving the most efficient regulatory process for
directing highly accurate information to the marketplace.85 To date,
every corporation implicated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had to
incur significant legal costs to determine the requirements of the dual
certifications.86 Thus, the first step in making the certification
requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act more efficient is to amend the
statute with an eye toward creating a single certification requirement
with clearly delineated consequences.
Congress should begin by abolishing the second certification
requirement in section 906 through the elimination of subsections (a)
and (b).87 Instead, section 906 should state that it exists solely as a
criminal penalty provision with respect to violations of section 302,
while section 302 should be amended to cross-reference section 906 as
a penalty provision for violations of the section 302 certification
requirements. These changes would eliminate the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's uncertainty as to the possibility of executives facing criminal
liability for meaningless deviations in highly technical disclosure
forms by remedying the lack of a materiality qualifier in the
certification requirement.
Dealing with the inconsistencies in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's
certifications is, however, merely a threshold measure. An effort to
streamline the compliance process will certainly reduce costs, but the
goal should be greater. Congress should look not just to the process,
but also to the substance. That is to say, if the post-
Enron/WorldCom objective is to bring trustworthy information into
the market as efficiently as possible, Congress should place the burden
of producing that information squarely on those corporate officers best
able to establish reliable internal controls.
85. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 62 (1995). This is a
problem of transaction costs, which are not the costs of producing the information, but rather are
the costs of trying to understand what section 906 certification requires.
86. See generally Bennett & Robinson, supra note 28.
87. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
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B. An Efficiency-Based Analysis Demands the Adoption of a Recklessness
Standard of Intent
This section begins with a brief look at the economic theory
behind financial disclosure laws. What follows are some examples of
the corporate reaction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's certification
requirements. Finally, we will see how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would
increase the accuracy of financial disclosures while creating a net
reduction in the economic costs associated with a corporate collapse, if
it included a recklessness standard of intent.
1. The Economics of Financial Disclosure Laws
The economics of information and investment would have us
expect that there is little need for regulatory disclosure rules and
penalties regarding misrepresentation and non-disclosure because
firms vying for scarce investor dollars have an incentive to produce a
good deal of highly accurate information." Over time, firms signaling
their ability to disseminate such information would fare better than
those without that reputation in the form of a lower cost of capital.8 9
Commentators call this the self-interest model of financial disclosure. 90
There are, however, limitations to the self-interest model.91
First, the information may be valuable not only to potential investors,
but also to third-party firms.92  This "free-rider"93 problem often
causes under production or intentional hiding of information to
protect a competitive advantage.94 Second, low-quality firms could
mimic the disclosure of high-quality firms by manipulating their
business models and making false statements.9" This problem is
exacerbated by the "cozy relationships ... [accounting] firms have
with corporate clients," which helps allow the inaccurate reporting.96
88. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 280 (1991); Ribstein, supra note 6 at 47-61 (arguing that the
market should be able to produce an adequate disclosure system now that fraud cases such as
Enron and WorldCom have revealed that the demand for such a system exists).
89. Id. at 53-55. Cost of capital is based on risk, a "price," if you will, that a business pays
for investment dollars.
90. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 88, at 290.
91. Id.
92. Id.; POSNER & SCOTT, supra note 8, at 325.
93. HARRISON, supra note 85, at 46. Free riding takes place when individuals are able to
take advantage of the benefits of activities of others without paying for those benefits.
94. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 88, at 290.
95. Id. at 280-81.
96. John Chartier, Accounting Fraud Rising, CNN MONEY, at
http://money.cnn.com/2002/01/11/companies/acctscandals/ (Jan. 11, 2002).
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Third, the emphasis on short-term gains over long-term value in
highly liquid securities markets creates an incentive to use accounting
processes that produce overly optimistic information.97 These market
failures result in what we might call the sub-optimal information
model because, left to its own devices, the market does not provide the
quantity and quality of information investors would prefer.98
The sub-optimal information model is further aggravated by the
agency problem that exists between the interests of management and
shareholders.99 Top-level executives now required to file certificates
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are often compensated through options
and bonuses based on short-term gains in stock price. 100 In contrast,
many shareholders, especially individuals, hold stocks in the hope of
long-term appreciation. This creates the kind of conflict that might
lead executives to hide losses in off-balance-sheet transactions or list
expenses as capital investments. 101
In response to the market failures of the financial information
distribution, the government has long imposed disclosure
requirements on those firms selling securities to the public."°2 These
regulatory disclosure requirements and the penalties imposed for
violating the requirements serve to offset the incentives not to disclose
information at the quantity and quality that we would see if the
problems associated with the sub-optimal information model did not
exist. The periodic financial statement certification requirement in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is also an attempt to impose checks on the agency
97. Andrew Osterland, Pay for Nonperformance?, CFO MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2002, at 65,
available at http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,75091 I 19,00.html.
98. But see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 88, at 280-83 (arguing that the market
will still operate efficiently even without anti-fraud regulations due to accounting oversight,
vetting by investment bankers, and stock option incentives for management). It should be
evident at this point that even with all of the safeguards in place that Easterbrook and Fischel
were convinced (in 1991) would prevent market failures, the need for corrective regulation is in
reality an absolute necessity.
99. This classic conflict of interest problem might be dealt with by the threat of a fiduciary
duty claim under agency law, though that threat has clearly been an insufficient deterrent thus
far. For possible explanations as to why management insiders choose to engage in fraud, see
Ribstein, supra note 6, at 20-22, discussing managerial overconfidence, investor's demand for a
high level of performance, and the incentive to cover up past frauds with even greater ongoing
fraud.
100. Osterland, supra note 97; see also Eric Wahlgren, Spreading the Yankee Way of Pay,
BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE (Apr. 18, 2001), at http://www.businessweek.com/careers/content/
apr2001/ca20010419_812.htm. According to Business Week, CEO's at the 365 largest publicly
traded U.S. companies earned an average of $13.1 million in 2000. Id.
101. See Eichenwald, supra note 2.
102. See generally 2 HAZEN, supra note 19. Recall the discussion of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These landmark pieces of legislation are ongoing
examples of government intervention.
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problem that seems to have caused the sort of deception and outright
fraud seen at Enron and WorldCom. 0 3
2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Merely Shifts Responsibility down the
Corporate Ladder
Before addressing the reasons that a recklessness standard would
promote the goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is important to
examine how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has changed the behavior of
executives during its short existence. On August 14, 2002, the first
meaningful deadline of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the two top
executives at 695 listed companies with annual revenues over $1.2
billion were required to certify their financial statements or admit
problems."°4 In the weeks leading up to that deadline, some executives
forced their own middle managers to sign documents stating that the
information they had provided to the higher-ups was accurate.1°
These back-up certifications have continued to find use, though their
legal effect is unclear.0 6
Certifications appear designed to create a paper trail that would
defeat the "knowingly" standard of culpability. °7 Certainly, these
measures do have positive aspects, such as giving middle managers a
reason to resist internal or external pressure to be creative with their
numbers, 10 8 and in turn giving CEOs and CFOs protection against
some violations that might be impossible for them to prevent.
However, these certifications also represent a practical failure of the
"willful" or "knowingly" standard because they undermine the stated
goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Passing the responsibility of
accurate reporting to subordinates represents the bare minimum an
executive can do to minimize his "knowledge" about disclosure
inaccuracies and to avoid the risk of personal liability. Given the
ineffectiveness of certifications in addressing the underlying problem,
this secondary certification scheme almost certainly would not have
prevented the Enron/WorldCom collapses that prompted such swift
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the first place.0 9
103. See discussion supra note 99.
104. In Search of Honesty, supra note 65. Senior executives of all 14,000 firms listed in the
United States, including those based overseas, were required to certify by August 29, 2002.
105. Id.
106. Bennett & Robinson, supra note 28, at 557-58.
107. Id.
108. In Search of Honesty, supra note 65 (quoting Prof. Robert Pozen of Harvard Law
School).
109. Enron CEO Ken Lay has claimed continuously, and with apparent success thus far
(i.e., no indictments), that he had no knowledge of the off-balance- sheet expenses scheme that
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3. A Recklessness Standard Would Increase Accuracy and Reduce the
Aggregate Costs in Shifting the Burden to Those Best Able to Create
Reliable Systems of Internal Control
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act may encourage executives to ignore
what is going on beneath them or to cease communicating openly with
middle management and auditors in an attempt to avoid liability. As
noted in the preceding section, some executives have attempted to
limit their potential criminal liability by having middle managers sign
truthfulness declarations."' Under the current standard, it is
conceivable, and even probable, that executives will seek to limit
communication with those employees as much as possible."' There
is, however, a solution. Using a standard of criminal intent lower than
knowledge, such as recklessness, would restore the incentive to both
communicate with middle management and establish an efficient
structure for producing accurate information.
The Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness would extend
the potential liability of corporate executives by making them liable
for inaction when past or present circumstances signal that the internal
accounting process is failing."' By adopting this standard, the CEO
and CFO of an offending corporation would face criminal liability not
only for taking affirmative acts that result in the filing of inaccurate
information, but also for consciously disregarding an unjustifiable risk
that the corporation's internal processes are producing periodic
financial reports that are materially inaccurate."' This standard
would apply, for instance, when circumstances indicate that the
corporation has had similar reporting failures in the past."' While
there would be initial uncertainty as to how pervasive past failures
must have been to trigger a charge based on the recklessness standard,
that difficulty could be mitigated by formal SEC opinions and the
development of case law. Furthermore, because it appears to be a
led to his company's collapse. At WorldCom, there is evidence that executives who would have
been implicated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are subject to criminal liability under the willful and
knowingly standard of the Securities Exchange Act §32(a), as well as securities fraud provisions.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05; Bennett & Robinson, supra note 28, at
557-58 (noting that "many executives have asked for back-up certifications from employees who
participate in preparing the reports... because they have been advised that they are legally
beneficial or because they believe that they are helpful in structuring their disclosure process").
111. Recall that not "knowing" precludes liability, and section 906 does not provide
penalties for the "internal controls" requirement in section 302.
112. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (definition of recklessness).
113. Id.
114. For example, if post-bankruptcy Enron or WorldCom failed to change their
accounting and financial disclosure processes, resulting in more restatements, it would be
difficult to argue that executives in those companies were not reckless.
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requirement of section 302, we must assume that the executives
implicated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have the ability to refine the
internal controls of their companies' processes for producing the
Exchange Act reports.1 ' Therefore, in amending section 906, the
criminal provisions should include a third set of penalties based on a
recklessness standard of intent. This standard should also be tied
directly to the requirement that the CEO/CFO review and approve
the internal processes for producing the information.'"6
As compared to the SEC, independent investment firms,
individual shareholders, and corporate executives are in the best
position to ensure accurate financial information enters the
marketplace at the lowest cost." 7 Executives have ready access to
internal data and the singular power, required under section 302, to
create or alter the internal process the corporation uses to prepare the
disclosures."' However, at present, these executives only face
criminal culpability under section 32(a) of the Exchange Act for
willful and knowing violations of section 302.1" As a practical matter,
it would be nearly impossible to "willfully" create an internal process
that results in fraudulent representations of material information
without otherwise becoming culpable for fraudulent representations
under the traditional Exchange Act intent standard. 2° Although the
penalties under the current system are a substantial deterrent, there are
no criminal consequences for even the sloppiest management of
financial disclosures, as long as the financial disclosures are not made
with the intent to deceive.' 2'
The economics of disclosure laws also suggest that even a strict
rule against fraud and misrepresentation (e.g., a recklessness standard)
will impose few additional costs on firms already dedicated to
producing accurate information. 122 Firms that have previously misled
investors (either intentionally or because of lax internal controls) will
bear the majority of compliance costs, thus rewarding firms that have
115. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4) (2003).
116. Id.
117. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 88, at 279-81; HARRISON, supra note 85,
at 28. This issue involves productive efficiency, which deals with whether a particular output is
being produced at the lowest possible cost.
118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003).
119. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2002).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 88, at 283. An anti-fraud rule
imposes low or no costs on the honest, high-quality firms.
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been, and continue to be, honest and well managed. 123 Again, because
'these firms, and more specifically their top tier of management, are
best able to control their own behavior, it is most efficient to place the
burden on them, rather than on the SEC or shareholders.
Opponents of the recklessness standard likely would criticize this
solution because of the increased costs associated with enforcing a
criminal statute with a lower standard of intent. 24  Admittedly, the
recklessness standard would impose some additional costs on
regulators and law enforcement because honest as well as dishonest
firms will have to be investigated over time. 12  For example, proving
recklessness as an element of intent will require much more than the
simple discovery of a memorandum indicating a fraudulent purpose or
the knowledge of deceit.126 Using recklessness as the standard might,
for instance, require detailed regulatory minimums of corporate
internal accounting and finance practice.'27 Because each industry, or
even each firm, will have its own specialized practices and business
models, generic regulation might be ineffective. 12  In contrast, the
more specific the regulation, the more costly it will be to administer
and to comply with.'29
However, the increased costs of a recklessness standard are not
prohibitive and are justified by the benefits of the recklessness
standard. First, the current scheme already requires substantial
investigative costs to distinguish between honest and dishonest firms.
Adding a recklessness standard will only result in a marginal cost
increase. Second, while the costs of enforcement and compliance
123. Id. at 283-85.
124. The SEC has estimated the increased time requirement for compliance with sections
302 and 906 at two burden hours per issuer in connection with preparing each quarterly report
on Forms 10-Qor 10-QSB and annual report on Forms 10-K, 10-KSB, 20-F or 40-F (for eight
burden hours total per year). With approximately 13,200 public companies implicated,
respondents will incur approximately 105,384 burden hours in the aggregate. The changes are
expected to raise the total burden hours for preparing those reports to 20,644,439, an increase of
0.53%. Certification of Disclosure in Certain Exchange Act Reports, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Release Nos. 33-8212, 34-47551, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,600, 15,603-04 (Mar. 31, 2003). Presumably,
adopting a recklessness standard would increase the burden on public companies more
substantially.
125. Id.
126. Investigations would likely be lengthy and complex, requiring more resources.
127. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) provide a good starting
point.
128. Requiring the same internal accounting and reporting structure for a multinational
commercial airline company, a national insurance company, and a small software manufacturer
would be inappropriate. Each will have different resources, organizations of management, and
sources of potential conflicts of interest.
129. See supra note 85 for the definition of transaction costs.
Seattle University Law Review
would rise under a recklessness standard,13 ° that increase is wholly
justified when we consider the benefits that would flow from such a
change. As explained above, the recklessness standard should have an
effect on corporate behavior by leading to financial disclosures that are
more accurate, with fewer instances of fraud. Providing accurate
financial disclosures, in turn, should go far in restoring investor
confidence, which is the stated purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.131
Accurate financial disclosures will allow investors to allocate their
capital to its highest and best use, as they will be able to distinguish
between high and low quality firms. Fewer cases of fraud will also
provide positive externalities outside of the firm-investor
relationship."' Fewer employees will lose their jobs because
companies like Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Anderson will not be
forced into bankruptcy, retirement accounts and pension funds will
become more reliable, and the general growth of the economy should
accelerate or at least cease being harmed. 3
Opponents of the recklessness standard might also argue that a
recklessness standard would create a level of uncertainty, particularly
at the outset, that would deter high quality candidates from seeking
those positions that are implicated by the rule. By its very nature,
using recklessness as a standard of intent requires executives to take
into account all the circumstances surrounding a disclosure that is
filed with false or misleading information. 134  Thus, how could an
executive ever know whether he or she has done enough to avoid
criminal culpability?
Although the recklessness standard creates some uncertainty
regarding liability, there are still strong incentives for prospective
executives to take and keep the executive positions implicated by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 3 ' Just as the maximum penalties in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act decrease from "willful" to "knowing" violations,
it is logical that they will decrease further under a recklessness
130. See discussion supra note 124. The SEC has recognized that even under the newly
created standards of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, financial issuers will face additional costs. Thus, it
is fairly clear that using a lower standard of intent would also increase costs.
131. Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 pmbl.
132. HARRISON, supra note 85, at 45. Positive externalities occur when the activities of an
individual or firm result in benefits, the value of which the producer is unable to internalize.
133. See supra note I (noting the detrimental impact that corporate collapses have on the
economy).
134. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (definition of recklessness).
135. Supra note 100. Executives get paid handsomely, they have prestigious jobs, and the
thousands of companies that have been able to comply with the disclosure requirements
illustrates that it is not overly difficult to present accurate information.
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standard.136  Moreover, as with any penalty scheme, first violations
would be dealt with much more leniently than repeat violations, 137 and
it would not take long for executives and their corporate counsel to
understand which actions, or omissions, would result in charges and
convictions.
Congress could also deal with the uncertainty problem by
amending section 906 to fall under the Exchange Act, rather than the
criminal code.'38 This would relegate the penalties and compliance
provisions to the SEC's regulatory authority, rather than leave it to the
discretion of the Department of Justice under Title 18 of the United
States Code.'39 As an administrative body with rulemaking authority,
the SEC could promulgate detailed examples of the minimum
requirements for avoiding a recklessness charge and operate as an
approval board for corporate executives with specific questions.1 40
Moreover, as with any new criminal law, a body of case law would
develop to establish the activities that will result in charges and
convictions for reckless behavior under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Therefore, while there will undoubtedly be some degree of
uncertainty, that uncertainty can be mitigated by giving greater
authority to the SEC and will eventually be clarified by well-
developed case law.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal government has mandatory financial disclosures for
publicly traded securities since passage of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. While that legislation has
evolved to meet the needs of the public and the investment
community, it was not enough to prevent the disastrous falls of Enron,
WorldCom, and an unknown number of other companies. In
attempting to save the proverbial day, Congress chose to limit criminal
culpability to willful and knowing violations of section 302 (via the
Exchange Act), and willful or knowing violations of the more limited
certification requirement in section 906. Although the increased
penalty maximums under both sections may satisfy the immediate
concerns of a wary public, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not go far
enough in allowing authorities to prosecute executives for actions and
136. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(c)(1)-(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1)-(2) (2003).
137. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2003) ("points" are
added for varying types of past criminal offenses).
138. U.S.C. Title 18.
139. See generally Bennett & Robinson, supra note 28, at 551-52.
140. Id.
2003]
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omissions that can so thoroughly devastate investors, employees, and
the economy as a whole.
The policy implications behind disclosure laws have always
included a balance between establishing requirements that provide a
sufficient amount of financial information such that investors can
allocate their resources efficiently, while imposing that requirement in
the least costly and intrusive manner. Because the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act fails on both sides of the scale by failing to add any new deterrents
against inaccurate disclosures and by imposing expensive dual
certification requirements, Congress and President Bush should
immediately act to amend the statutes in question. First, lawmakers
must rectify the dual certification requirement in section 906. As it
stands, section 906 is redundant, yet also ambiguous enough to impose
unwarranted costs on corporations and regulators. Second, criminal
culpability should be extended to cover executive recklessness that
results in violations of the section 302(a)(4) internal controls
requirement. Enforcement should be placed in the hands of the
SEC-an agency with the expertise to provide executives with a
greater degree of certainty as to what type of conduct will not be
tolerated. The likely effect of these amendments would be to (1)
increase the accuracy of obtaining the information, (2) create a net
reduction in economic costs that result from corporate collapses, and
(3) restore much-needed investor confidence.
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